German plan for the summer campaign of 1942. Plans of the Hitlerite military command

thesis

1.1 Plans of Hitler's military command

On the eve of the second year of the Great Patriotic War, the situation in the Soviet Union remained difficult. Its material and human losses were enormous, and the territories captured by the enemy were vast. However, the strategy of Nazi Germany’s “blitzkrieg” war against the USSR failed. In a grandiose armed confrontation on the outskirts of Moscow, Red Army troops defeated the main Wehrmacht group and drove it back from the Soviet capital. The Battle of Moscow has not yet finally decided the outcome of the struggle in favor of the USSR, but it marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Patriotic War and the Second World War.

According to the plans of the German command, the forty-second year was supposed to be the decisive year in the war, because Hitler was confident that the United States and England would not attempt to land their troops in Europe this year; he still had a free hand for actions in the east.

However, the defeat near Moscow and the losses in the summer of 1941 inflicted by the Red Army on the invaders could not but have an impact. Despite the fact that by the spring of '42, Hitler's army had increased in number and received significant technical equipment, the German command did not find the strength to attack along the entire front.

“At the end of 1941, 9,500 thousand were under arms in Hitler’s army, and in 1942 there were already 10,204 thousand” Morozov V.P. The historical feat of Stalingrad. - M., 1982. - P. 41... The overall strength of the army increased, and the chief of Hitler’s general staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Halder, wrote the following significant entry in his diary: “As of May 1, 1942, 318 thousand people are missing in the East. It is proposed to send 240 thousand people to the army in the East in May. For the period from May to September there is a reserve of 960 thousand young conscripts. Then in September there will be nothing left” Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: a war diary. - Smolensk, 2001. - P. 231. .

Somewhat later, at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW, a more precise document was drawn up regarding the general condition of Hitler’s army. The certificate intended for Hitler stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the inability to fully ensure their replenishment with people and materiel.”

“And yet, by the summer of forty-two,” writes General Chuikov, “Hitler managed to concentrate quite significant forces against us. On the Soviet-German front, he had an army of six million, numbering up to 43 thousand guns and mortars, over three thousand tanks, and up to three and a half thousand combat aircraft. The forces are significant. Hitler started the war with the smaller ones” Chuikov V.I. Battle of the century. - M., 1985. - P. 211. .

Hitler undertook a campaign in the Caucasus with the aim of seizing oil sources and access to the Iranian border, to the Volga. He apparently hoped that at a distance from the center of the country, the resistance of the Soviet troops would not be so thorough.

By entering the Caucasus, Hitler hoped to drag Turkey into the war, which would give him another twenty to thirty divisions. By reaching the Volga and the Iranian border, he hoped to drag Japan into the war against the Soviet Union. The performance of Turkey and Japan was his last chance for success in the war against us. Only this can explain such a broadcast nature of his directive for the spring-summer campaign of 1942.

Let us turn to the text of this directive, known as Directive No. 41. The introduction itself does not contain an analysis of the current situation on the Soviet-German front, but propaganda idle talk.

The directive begins with these words: “The winter campaign in Russia is approaching its end. Thanks to the outstanding courage and readiness of the soldiers of the Eastern Front for self-sacrifice, our defensive actions were crowned with great success by German weapons. The enemy suffered huge losses in men and equipment. In an effort to exploit his apparent initial success, he spent this winter most of the reserves intended for further operations.

“The goal,” says the directive, “is to completely destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and to deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers.”

“...First of all, all available forces must be concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the goal of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.”

And here comes a disclaimer. “The final encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Ingria are postponed until a change in the situation in the encirclement area or the release of other sufficient forces for this purpose creates the appropriate opportunities.”

This reservation shows that Hitler, having forces greater than those with which he began his campaign in Russia, did not dare to carry out operations along the entire front, but concentrated everything in the south.

As General Chuikov wrote: “The Directive is a document of a secret nature, a document that a limited circle of people had the right to familiarize itself with, it is a document in which there is no place for propaganda formulations. He must accurately and soberly assess the situation. We see that in its premise the German command completely incorrectly assesses our forces, and is trying to portray its defeat near Moscow as a military success. Underestimating our strengths, Hitler at the same time overestimates his own.” Chuikov V.I. Battle of the century. - P. 234. .

Thus, the main goal of the enemy’s offensive on the Eastern Front, according to Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. “However, unlike the Barbarossa plan,” writes A.M. Samsonov, - achieving this political goal was no longer based on the “blitzkrieg” strategy. That is why Directive No. 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, and take possession of the southern regions of the USSR, rich in strategic raw materials.” Samsonov A.M. Battle of Stalingrad. - M., 1989. - P. 327. . To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasus directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task on the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.

Hitler declared on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 “the Russian army will be completely destroyed” Welz G. Soldiers who were betrayed. - Smolensk, 1999. - P. 69. . It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the scope of the real strategy. But there was more likely something else going on here.

Hitler's inherently adventurous policy could not be built on the basis of deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations for 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack, and even whether to attack at all, on the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult for Hitler's generals.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful implementation of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. This strategic plan of the enemy very much reflected the urgent need of Nazi Germany for fuel.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the command staff of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler stated that “if he does not receive the oil of Maikop and Grozny, he will have to end this war.” Nuremberg Trials / Ed. Batova P.I. - M., 1994. - P. 178. . At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the USSR's loss of oil would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. “It was a subtle calculation that was closer to its goal than is generally believed after its final catastrophic failure” Liddell Hart B. G. Strategy of indirect actions. - M., 1997. - P. 347-348. .

So, the German military command no longer had confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. “The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began fighting on the continent of Europe. The Nazis had no doubt that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened.” Dashichev V.I. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. T. 2: Aggression against the USSR. The fall of the "third empire". - M., 1983. - P. 125. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR for some people looked completely different than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity on this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the German high command was faced with the question of what form to continue the war in: offensive or defensive. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of our chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. 1942 was the last year in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to decide what should be done on a front 3 thousand kilometers long to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that along most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive.” Stalingrad: lessons from history / Ed. Chuikova V.I. - M., 1980. - P. 134.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among Hitler's generals. “The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front with the goal of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also favored resuming the offensive, but, as before, continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended launching the main attack on Moscow with the forces of Army Group Center Butlar von. War in Russia / World War 1939-1945 - M., 1957.- P. 92. . Halder believed that the defeat of Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl, ordered the main efforts of German troops in the summer of 1942 to be directed south to capture the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, the operation to capture Leningrad was planned to be postponed until the troops in the south were released.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, hoping to defeat the Soviet troops here in successive operations piecemeal. Thus, although Hitler’s strategists first began to show hesitation when planning the 1942 campaign, nevertheless, as before, the highest military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a common point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited.

According to the plan of Hitler's military-political leadership, the fascist German troops in the summer campaign of 1942 still had to achieve the military and political goals set by the Barbarossa plan, which were not achieved in 1941 due to the defeat near Moscow. The main blow was supposed to be delivered on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front with the aim of capturing the city of Stalingrad, reaching the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and the fertile regions of the Don, Kuban and Lower Volga, disrupting communications connecting the center of the country with the Caucasus, and creating conditions for ending the war in their favor (see Appendix 1). Hitler's strategists believed that the loss of Donbass and Caucasian oil would seriously weaken the Soviet Union, and the entry of Nazi troops into Transcaucasia would disrupt its ties with its allies through the Caucasus and Iran and would help drag Turkey into a war against it.

Based on the assigned tasks, changes were made to the structure of the command of troops on the southern wing of the German Eastern Front. Army Group South (Field Marshal F. von Bock) was divided into two: Army Group B (4th Panzer, 2nd and 6th Field German and 2nd Hungarian Armies; Colonel General M . von Weichs) and Army Group A (1st Panzer, 17th and 11th German Field Armies and 8th Italian Armies; Field Marshal W. List).

For the offensive in the Stalingrad direction, the 6th Field Army (General of Tank Forces F. Paulus) was allocated from Army Group B. On July 17, 1942, it included 13 divisions, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. It was supported by aviation of the 4th Air Fleet (up to 1200 aircraft).

The capture of Stalingrad was very important to Hitler for several reasons. It was a major industrial city on the banks of the Volga (a vital transport route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia). The capture of Stalingrad would provide security on the left flank of the German armies advancing into the Caucasus. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin, Hitler's main enemy, made the capture of the city a winning ideological and propaganda move. Stalin also had ideological and propaganda interests in protecting the city that bore his name.

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The general concept of the offensive in the summer campaign of 1942 on the Eastern Front and the plan for the main operation were set out in Directive of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht No. 41 of April 5, 1942. The main goal of the fascist German troops on the Eastern Front was to completely defeat the Soviet troops in the south of the country, seize the oil regions of the Caucasus, the rich agricultural regions of the Don and Kuban, disrupt communications connecting the center of the country with the Caucasus, and create conditions for ending the war in for your benefit. The main operation was planned to be carried out in three stages in the form of a series of separate offensives, following directly one after the other, interconnected and complementary.

At the first stage, it was planned, through private operations in the Crimea, near Kharkov and other parts of the Eastern Front, to improve the operational position of the Nazi troops and level the front line in order to free up maximum forces for the main operation. At the second stage of the operation, it was planned to strike from Kharkov to Voronezh with the strike group turning south, with the aim of encircling Soviet troops in the area between the Donets and Don rivers. After the defeat of the encircled Soviet troops, it was planned to capture the areas of Stalingrad, the Lower Volga and the Caucasus. At the third stage, it was planned to transfer troops released in the south to strengthen Army Group North to capture Leningrad.

By the end of the spring of 1942, the Wehrmacht in terms of personnel (about 5.5 million people) and weapons was approximately at the level of its invasion of the USSR. Germany's allies sent up to a million of their soldiers to the Eastern Front. The number of German tank divisions was increased from 19 to 25, while the combat power and equipment of an individual division increased. On the eve of the offensive, the German divisions were staffed to full strength. Most of the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of these divisions had combat experience in offensive operations. German aviation continued to dominate the air. The advantage of the Wehrmacht over the opposing Soviet armed forces was not so much in the number of troops, but in their quality. The soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht believed in the Fuhrer of the German people - A. Hitler. The first military successes of the summer of 1942 muted the bitterness of the winter defeats, and the offensive spirit in the Wehrmacht units was almost as high as at the beginning of the Blitzkrieg.

In furtherance of Directive No. 41, Hitler signs the Blau plan, according to which Wehrmacht troops, initially advancing in the direction of Voronezh, should mislead the Soviet command about the final goal of the offensive and pin down Soviet reserves in the Moscow region. With an unexpected and fastest possible turn of the fascist German troops along the Don to the south, Hitler planned to capture the Donetsk coal basin, seize the oil region of the Caucasus and block the path of water transport along the Volga at Stalingrad. The extended northern flank of this operation along the right bank of the Don was to be covered by Hungarian, Italian and Romanian troops.

The implementation of this operation was entrusted to Army Groups “A” and “B”, which included 5 fully equipped German armies, numbering more than 900 thousand people, 17 thousand guns, 1.2 thousand tanks, supported by 1640 aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet Air Force. The southern Army Group A, under the command of Field Marshal List, included the 17th Field and 1st Panzer Armies, and the northern Army Group B, under the command of Field Marshal von Bock, included the 4th Panzer, 2nd and the 6th Field Army.

Since March, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Soviet Union have also been developing a new strategic plan for the summer of 1942. They had no doubt that with the onset of summer or even spring, the Nazi troops would try to recapture the strategic initiative, and they tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans.

Military intelligence and state security agencies reported that Germany would deliver the main blow in the south of the Soviet-German front.

However, the intelligence data was not fully taken into account. Headquarters and the General Staff proceeded from the fact that the strongest group of the Wehrmacht continued to be in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, still threatening the capital of the USSR. Therefore, they considered it most likely that the Wehrmacht would deliver the main blow in the Moscow direction.

An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be the active strategic defense of Soviet troops without large-scale offensive actions, in the accumulation of powerful trained reserves and military equipment, and only after that could the transition to a decisive offensive be carried out. Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, contrary to the current situation, with a directive of April 8, 1942, ordered the commanders of a number of fronts to go on the offensive in order to force the Wehrmacht to use up its reserves and thus ensure victory over Germany already in 1942. However, calculations for the rapid depletion of the Nazi troops turned out to be completely unfounded, and the tactics of the General Staff, built on a combination of defense and offensive simultaneously in several directions, led to catastrophic results.

Despite the huge losses of 1941, by May 1942 there were more than 5.5 million people in the ranks of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front. The troops lacked experienced commanders. Military infantry and mortar and machine gun schools of the Red Army trained platoon commanders - junior lieutenants - according to accelerated programs, in just six months, and the training of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders in reserve regiments, training battalions and regimental schools was carried out even faster. Newly formed and reorganized divisions most often rushed to the front without the necessary training, understaffed with personnel and weapons, and without well-developed interaction between units.

Home front workers made incredible efforts to increase the production of military equipment and ammunition for the front. Among the huge mass of obsolete equipment, T-34 and KV tanks and new types of aircraft began to increasingly arrive at the front. Soviet troops continued to experience an urgent need for vehicles, anti-aircraft artillery, engineering equipment and communications equipment.

In the summer of 1942, Hitler planned to again seize the initiative on the Soviet-German front with the goal of destroying the vital sources of Soviet power, the most important military-economic centers. The strategic goals of the summer campaign of 1942 were the conquest of the fertile southern lands of Russia (bread), the acquisition of coal in the Donbass and the oil of the Caucasus, the transformation of Turkey from a neutral into an ally, and the blocking of the Iranian and Volga Lend-Lease routes. Initially, the invasion of the grandiose region between the Black and Caspian Seas was called "Siegfried", but as the plan was developed and detailed, it became known as "Blau" ("Blue").

To achieve these goals, it was planned to involve, in addition to the German armed forces, the armed forces of the Allies as much as possible.

The plan for the summer campaign of the German army on the Soviet-German front was set out in OKW Directive No. 41 of 04/05/1942. (Appendix 2.1)

The main task set by Hitler, while maintaining the position in the central sector, was to take Leningrad in the north and establish contacts on land with the Finns, and on the southern flank of the front to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus. This task was planned to be accomplished by dividing it into several stages, taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities.

First of all, all available forces were concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the goal of destroying Soviet troops west of the Don, in order to then capture oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.

The capture of Leningrad was postponed until a change in the situation around the city or the release of other sufficient forces for this purpose created the appropriate opportunities.

The primary task of the ground forces and aviation after the end of the thaw period was to stabilize and strengthen the entire Eastern Front and rear areas with the task of freeing up as many forces as possible for the main operation, while at the same time being able to repel the enemy’s attack with small forces on other fronts. For this purpose, it was planned to conduct offensive operations of a limited scale, concentrating the offensive assets of ground forces and aviation to achieve quick and decisive successes with superior forces.

Before the start of the main offensive in the south, it was planned to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol to clear the entire Crimea from Soviet troops, providing routes for the supply of allied troops, ammunition and fuel through the ports of Crimea. Block the Soviet navy in the ports of the Caucasus. Destroy the Barvenkovsky bridgehead of Soviet troops, wedged on both sides of Izyum.

The main operation on the Eastern Front. Its goal is to defeat and destroy the Russian troops located in the Voronezh region, to the south of it, as well as to the west and north of the river. Don.

Due to the scale of the operation, the grouping of Nazi troops and their allies had to be built up gradually, and therefore, the operation was proposed to be divided into a series of successive but interconnected strikes, complementary to each other and distributed in time from north to south in such a way , so that in each of these attacks, as many forces as possible of both the ground army and especially the aviation are concentrated in decisive directions.

Having assessed the resilience of the Soviet troops during battles in encirclement, Hitler proposed carrying out deep breakthroughs of mechanized units in order to encircle and tightly block the Soviet troops with approaching infantry units. The plan also required that tank and motorized troops provide direct assistance to the German infantry by striking in the rear of the pincered enemy with the aim of completely destroying him.

The main operation was to begin with an enveloping offensive from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh towards the Moscow defense line. The purpose of this breakthrough was to capture the city of Voronezh, and to hide from the Soviet command the true direction of the main attack on the Caucasus (the distance from Voronezh to Moscow is 512 km, Saratov - 511 km, Stalingrad - 582 km, Krasnodar - 847 km).

At the second stage of the plan, part of the infantry divisions advancing behind the tank and motorized formations was supposed to immediately equip a powerful defensive line from the initial offensive area in the Orel area in the direction of Voronezh, and the mechanized formations were supposed to continue the offensive with their left flank from Voronezh along the river. Don to the south to interact with troops making a breakthrough approximately from the Kharkov area to the east. With this, the enemy hoped to encircle and defeat Soviet troops in the Voronezh direction, reach the Don in the section from Voronezh to Novaya Kalitva (40 km south of Pavlovsk) to the rear of the main forces of the Southwestern Front and seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the Don. Of the two groupings of tank and motorized forces intended for enveloping maneuver, the northern one should be stronger than the southern one.

At the third stage of this operation, the forces striking down the Don River were supposed to unite in the Stalingrad area with the forces advancing from the Taganrog, Artemovsk area between the lower reaches of the Don River and Voroshilovgrad through the Seversky Donets River to the east. The plan was to reach Stalingrad, or at least expose it to heavy weapons so that it would lose its importance as a center of military industry and a communications hub.

To continue the operations planned for the subsequent period, it was planned to either capture undamaged bridges in Rostov itself, or firmly capture bridgeheads south of the Don River.

Before the start of the offensive, the Taganrog group was planned to be reinforced with tanks and motorized units in order to prevent the majority of the Soviet troops defending north of the Don River from leaving the river to the south.

The directive required not only to protect the northeastern flank of the advancing troops, but also to immediately begin equipping positions on the Don River, creating a powerful anti-tank defense and preparing defensive positions for the winter and providing them with all the necessary means for this.

To occupy positions on the front being created along the Don River, which would increase as operations unfolded, it was planned to allocate allied formations in order to use the released German divisions as a mobile reserve behind the front line on the Don River.

The directive provided for the distribution of allied forces in such a way that the Hungarians would be located in the northernmost sectors, then the Italians, and the Romanians furthest to the southeast. Since the Hungarians and Romanians were bitterly hostile, the Italian army was stationed between them.

Hitler assumed that the Soviet troops would be encircled and destroyed north of the Don and, therefore, after overcoming the Don line, he demanded that the troops advance beyond the Don to the south as quickly as possible, since this was forced by the short duration of the favorable time of year. Thus, Hitler’s strategists were preparing to create a gigantic encirclement of Soviet troops in a vast area that was extremely inconvenient for their defense. And then on the waterless, scorched by the southern sun, smooth as a table, steppe expanses would be dominated by enemy tank and aviation fists.

To carry out an offensive in the Caucasus, already on April 22, 1942, an order was issued from the head of the armament department of the ground army and the head of replenishment on the creation of a command of Army Group “A” with a combat readiness headquarters by 20.5.42. Field Marshal List was appointed commander of the army group. Lieutenant General von Greifenberg was appointed chief of staff of the army group, and colonel of the general staff von Gildenfeldt was appointed first officer of the general staff. During formation, for camouflage purposes, the headquarters is called “Anton Headquarters.”

Operation planning and preparatory work for them are carried out by Army Group South, the corresponding instructions and orders are transmitted to the future command of Army Group A during their development at the headquarters of Army Group South.

On May 23, the working headquarters arrives in Poltava and, under the code name “Azov Coastal Headquarters,” is placed under the command of the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Bock, whose headquarters had previously led military operations on the entire southern sector of the eastern front and was also located in Poltava.

On June 1, Hitler leaves for Poltava, accompanied by Field Marshal Keitel. The commander-in-chief of Army Group "South", the chief of staff of Army Group "South" and the army commanders takes part in the discussion of the situation at the front by the chief of the "Azov Coastal Headquarters". An order is issued about the tasks of the command during operations and preparation for them. Over time, the “Azov coastal headquarters” became involved in the affairs of the armies that later came under his command.

10.6.42 The operational department of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces issues an order on the command of Crimea after the fall of Sevastopol, according to which all ground forces operating in Crimea are commanded by the commander of 42AK, subordinate, after the transfer of command, to the “Coastal Headquarters Azov”. On July 11, an order was issued on the procedure for introducing troops arriving in the second place into battle for the 11th and 17th armies, and on July 5, the operational department of the General Staff reported on the procedure for transferring troops from Crimea to areas 17A and 1TA. First of all, the infantry of the 73rd and 125th Infantry should be transferred, secondly the infantry of the 9th Infantry, and thirdly the infantry of the security division. To guard the Crimea region, one German division each is left in Sevastopol and Simferopol, the third battalion of the 204th tank regiment of the 22nd tank division, and a sufficient number of Romanian formations.

On July 5 at 14.45, the “Azov coastal headquarters” received by telephone the final order to assume command from the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces. On July 7, the “Azov coastal headquarters” at 0.00 in encrypted form takes over command of 11A, 17A, with the Witersheim group (57TK), 1TA, Romanian formations, and the Italian 8th Army (upon its arrival in the unloading area) subordinate to it.

In total, by June 28, 1942, on the Soviet-German front, the enemy had 11 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups, which included 230 divisions and 16 brigades - 5,655 thousand people, more than 49 thousand guns and mortars, 3, 7 thousand tanks and assault guns. These forces were supported from the air by aviation from three air fleets, the Vostok aviation group, as well as aviation from Finland and Romania, which had about 3.2 thousand combat aircraft.

The largest grouping of Wehrmacht forces - Army Group South, which made up 37 percent of infantry and cavalry and 53 percent of tank and motorized formations, was deployed by the last ten days of June 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It consisted of 97 divisions, of which 76 were infantry, 10 tank, 8 motorized and 3 cavalry. (History of the Second World War vol. 5, p. 145)

As a result of the measures taken to strategically deploy troops for the summer offensive of 1942 on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the total number of armies in Army Group South increased to eight; In addition, the 3rd Romanian Army followed in marching order to Ukraine.

The enemy held the operational-strategic initiative in his hands. Under the circumstances, this was an extremely great advantage, providing the Nazi command with freedom to choose the direction of attack and the opportunity to create a decisive superiority of forces and means in this direction.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army recognized the possibility of a summer offensive by the German army in the south, but believed that the enemy, who held a large group of his troops in close proximity to Moscow, would most likely deliver the main blow not towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but to the flank of the central grouping of the Red Army with the goal of capturing Moscow and the central industrial region, therefore Headquarters continued to strengthen the central section of the front and strengthen the Bryansk Front, the bulk of whose troops were grouped on the right wing, covering the direction to Moscow through Tula.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief had no doubt that the main task of the Wehrmacht remained the same - the capture of Moscow. Taking this into account, the General Staff in July 1942 analyzed the general operational-strategic situation and events on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. It was necessary to decide which of the two directions - to the Caucasus or to Stalingrad - was the main one. The distribution of troops and materiel, the use of strategic reserves, forms of interaction between fronts, the nature of preparatory measures, and much more depended on this decision.

The General Staff took into account that the Caucasus direction was connected for the enemy with the need to overcome a powerful mountain barrier with a relatively poorly developed network of convenient roads. Breaking through our defenses in the mountains required large available forces, and in the future a significant replenishment of troops with people and equipment. The enemy's main strike weapon - numerous tanks - could only roam the fields of the Kuban, and in mountainous conditions they lost a significant share of their combat capabilities. The position of Hitler's troops in the Caucasus would have been seriously complicated by the fact that their flank and rear, under favorable conditions, could have been threatened by our Stalingrad front and troops concentrated in the area south of Voronezh.

In general, the General Staff considered it unlikely that Hitler’s troops would deploy their main operations in the Caucasus. According to General Staff estimates, the Stalingrad direction was more promising for the enemy. Here the terrain was conducive to the conduct of extensive combat operations by all types of troops, and up to the Volga there were no major water barriers, except the Don. With the enemy's access to the Volga, the position of the Soviet fronts would become very difficult, and the country would be cut off from sources of oil in the Caucasus. The lines through which the Allies supplied us through Iran would also be disrupted. (Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years, Voenizdat 1981, vol. 1, p. 87)

Taking this into account, the bulk of the strategic reserves were located in the western and also in the southwestern direction, which subsequently allowed the Headquarters to use them where the Nazi command delivered the main blow. Hitler's intelligence was unable to reveal either the number of reserves of the Soviet Supreme High Command or their location.

Due to an underestimation of the southern direction, Headquarters reserves were not stationed there - the main means of influencing strategic leadership on the course of important operations. Options for action by Soviet troops in case of a sudden change in the situation were not worked out. In turn, underestimating the role of the southern direction led to tolerance for the mistakes of the command of the Southwestern and partly the Southern fronts.

As a result of the unsuccessful actions of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts during the May offensive in the Kharkov direction, the situation and balance of forces in the south changed sharply in favor of the enemy. Having eliminated the Barvenkovsky ledge, German troops significantly improved their operational position and took advantageous starting positions for a further offensive in the eastern direction. (diagram of Operation Wilhelm and Frederick 1)

Soviet troops, having suffered significant losses, gained a foothold by mid-June at the line of Belgorod, Kupyansk, Krasny Liman and put themselves in order. Having gone on the defensive, they did not have time to properly gain a foothold on new lines. The reserves available in the southwestern direction were used up.

Abstract

USSR during the Great Patriotic War

Completed by: student of group AF 11-11 Matveev A.V.

Head: Gryaznukhin A. G.

Krasnoyarsk 2011

In 1941, World War II entered a new phase. By this time, Nazi Germany and its allies had captured virtually all of Europe. In connection with the destruction of Polish statehood, a joint Soviet-German border was established. In 1940, the Fascist leadership developed the Barbarossa plan, the goal of which was the lightning defeat of the Soviet armed forces and the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union. Further plans included the complete destruction of the USSR. To achieve this, 153 German divisions and 37 divisions of its allies (Finland, Romania and Hungary) were concentrated in the eastern direction. They were supposed to strike in three directions: central (Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow), northwestern (Baltic states - Leningrad) and southern (Ukraine with access to the Black Sea coast). A lightning campaign was planned to capture the European part of the USSR before the fall of 1941.

SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT

Beginning of the war

The implementation of the Barbarossa plan began at dawn on June 22, 1941. With widespread air bombing of the largest industrial and strategic centers, as well as the offensive of the ground forces of Germany and its allies along the entire European border of the USSR (over 4.5 thousand km) During the first few days, German troops advanced tens and hundreds of kilometers. In the central direction at the beginning of July 1941, all of Belarus was captured and German troops reached the approaches to Smolensk. In the northwestern direction, the Baltic states were occupied; Leningrad was blocked on September 9. In the south, Moldova and Right Bank Ukraine are occupied. Thus, by the autumn of 1941, Hitler’s plan to seize the vast territory of the European part of the USSR was carried out.

Immediately after the German attack, the Soviet government carried out major military-political and economic measures to repel aggression. On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was created. On July 10, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, S.K. Timoshenko, S.M. Budyonny, K.E. Voroshilov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, and G.K. Zhukov. By a directive of June 29, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks set the entire country the task of mobilizing all forces and means to fight the enemy. On June 30, the State Defense Committee was created, concentrating all power in the country. The military doctrine was radically revised, the task was put forward to organize strategic defense, wear down and stop the advance of the fascist troops.

At the end of June - the first half of July 1941, large defensive border battles unfolded (defense of the Brest Fortress, etc.). From July 16 to August 15, the defense of Smolensk continued in the central direction. In the northwestern direction, the German plan to capture Leningrad failed. In the south, the defense of Kyiv was carried out until September 1941, and Odessa until October. The stubborn resistance of the Red Army in the summer - autumn of 1941 thwarted Hitler's plan for a lightning war. At the same time, the seizure by the fascist command by the fall of 1941 of the vast territory of the USSR with its most important industrial centers and grain regions was a serious loss for the Soviet government.

Moscow Battle

At the end of September - beginning of October 1941, the German Operation Typhoon began, aimed at capturing Moscow. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through in the central direction on October 5-6. Bryansk and Vyazma fell. The second line near Mozhaisk delayed the German offensive for several days. On October 10, G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the Western Front. On October 19, a state of siege was introduced in the capital. In bloody battles, the Red Army managed to stop the enemy - the October stage of Hitler’s offensive on Moscow ended. The three-week respite was used by the Soviet command to strengthen the defense of the capital, mobilize the population into the militia, accumulate military equipment and, first of all, aviation. On November 6, a ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council of Workers' Deputies was held, dedicated to the anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 7, a traditional parade of units of the Moscow garrison took place on Red Square. For the first time, other military units also took part in it, including militias who left straight from the parade to the front. These events contributed to the patriotic upsurge of the people and strengthened their faith in victory.

The second stage of the Nazis' offensive on Moscow began on November 15, 1941. At the cost of huge losses, they managed to reach the approaches to Moscow in late November - early December, enveloping it in a semicircle in the north in the Dmitrov area (Moscow-Volga canal), in the south - near Tula. At this point the German offensive fizzled out. The defensive battles of the Red Army, in which many soldiers and militias died, were accompanied by the accumulation of forces at the expense of Siberian divisions, aviation and other military equipment. On December 5-6, a counteroffensive of the Red Army began, as a result of which the enemy was thrown back 100-250 km from Moscow. Kalinin, Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga, and other cities and towns were liberated. Hitler's plan for a lightning war was thwarted.

In the winter of 1942, units of the Red Army carried out an offensive on other fronts. However, breaking the blockade of Leningrad failed. In the south, the Kerch Peninsula and Feodosia were liberated from the Nazis. The victory near Moscow in conditions of the enemy’s military-technical superiority was the result of the heroic efforts of the Soviet people.

Summer-autumn campaign of 1942

The fascist leadership in the summer of 1942 relied on the seizure of the oil regions of southern Russia and the industrial Donbass. JV Stalin made a new strategic mistake in assessing the military situation, in determining the direction of the enemy’s main attack, and in underestimating his forces and reserves. In connection with this, his order for the Red Army to advance simultaneously on several fronts led to serious defeats near Kharkov and in the Crimea. Kerch and Sevastopol were lost. At the end of June 1942, a general German offensive unfolded. Fascist troops, during stubborn battles, reached Voronezh, the upper reaches of the Don and captured Donbass. Then they broke through our defenses between the Northern Donets and the Don. This made it possible for Hitler's command to solve the main strategic task of the summer campaign of 1942 and launch a broad offensive in two directions: to the Caucasus and to the east - to the Volga.

In the Caucasus direction at the end of July 1942, a strong enemy group crossed the Don. As a result, Rostov, Stavropol and Novorossiysk were captured. Stubborn fighting took place in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range, where specially trained enemy alpine riflemen operated in the mountains. Despite the successes achieved in the Caucasus, the fascist command was never able to solve its main task - to break into the Transcaucasus to seize the oil reserves of Baku. By the end of September, the offensive of fascist troops in the Caucasus was stopped.

An equally difficult situation for the Soviet command arose in the eastern direction. To cover it, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. In connection with the current critical situation, Order No. 227 of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was issued, which stated: “To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time our Motherland.” At the end of July 1942, the enemy under the command of General von Paulus struck a powerful blow on the Stalingrad front. However, despite the significant superiority in forces, within a month the fascist troops managed to advance only 60-80 km and with great difficulty reached the distant defensive lines of Stalingrad. In August they reached the Volga and intensified their offensive.

From the first days of September, the heroic defense of Stalingrad began, which lasted virtually until the end of 1942. Its significance during the Great Patriotic War was enormous. During the struggle for the city, Soviet troops under the command of generals V.I. Chuikov and M.S. Shumilov in September - November 1942 repelled up to 700 enemy attacks and passed all tests with honor. Thousands of Soviet patriots showed themselves heroically in the battles for the city. As a result, enemy troops suffered colossal losses in the battles for Stalingrad. Every month of the battle, about 250 thousand new Wehrmacht soldiers and officers, the bulk of military equipment, were sent here. By mid-November 1942, the Nazi troops, having lost more than 180 thousand people killed and 50 thousand wounded, were forced to stop the offensive.

During the summer-autumn campaign, the Nazis managed to occupy a huge part of the European part of the USSR, where about 15% of the population lived, 30% of gross output was produced, and more than 45% of the cultivated area was located. However, it was a Pyrrhic victory. The Red Army exhausted and bled the fascist hordes. The Germans lost up to 1 million soldiers and officers, more than 20 thousand guns, over 1,500 tanks. The enemy was stopped. The resistance of the Soviet troops made it possible to create favorable conditions for their transition to a counteroffensive in the Stalingrad area.

Battle of Stalingrad

Even during the fierce battles, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to develop a plan for a grandiose offensive operation designed to encircle and defeat the main forces of the Nazi troops operating directly near Stalingrad. G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky made a great contribution to the preparation of this operation, called “Uranus”. To accomplish this task, three new fronts were created: Southwestern (N.F. Vatutin), Don (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (A.I. Eremenko). In total, the offensive group included more than 1 million people, 13 thousand guns and mortars, about 1000 tanks, and 1500 aircraft. November 19, 1942 The offensive of the Southwestern and Don Fronts began. A day later, the Stalingrad Front advanced. The offensive was unexpected for the Germans. It developed at lightning speed and successfully. November 23, 1942 A historic meeting and unification of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts took place. As a result, the German group at Stalingrad (330 thousand soldiers and officers under the command of General von Paulus) was surrounded.

Hitler's command could not come to terms with the current situation. They formed Army Group "Don" consisting of 30 divisions. It was supposed to strike at Stalingrad, break through the outer front of the encirclement and connect with the 6th Army of von Paulus. However, an attempt made in mid-December to carry out this task ended in a new major defeat for German and Italian forces. By the end of December, having defeated this group, Soviet troops reached the Kotelnikovo area and began an attack on Rostov. This made it possible to begin the final destruction of the encircled German troops. M January 10 to February 2, 1943. They were finally liquidated.

The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad led to a widespread offensive by the Red Army on all fronts: in January 1943, the blockade of Leningrad was broken; in February - the North Caucasus was liberated; in February - March - in the central (Moscow) direction, the front line moved back by 130-160 km. As a result of the autumn-winter campaign of 1942/43, the military power of Nazi Germany was significantly undermined.

Battle of Kursk

In the central direction, after successful actions in the spring of 1943, the so-called Kursk ledge was formed on the front line. Hitler's command, wanting to regain the strategic initiative, developed Operation Citadel to break through and encircle the Red Army in the Kursk region. Unlike 1942, the Soviet command guessed the enemy's intentions and created a deeply layered defense in advance.

The Battle of Kursk is the largest battle of the Second World War. About 900 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks (including the latest models - Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand guns), more than 2 thousand aircraft took part in it from Germany; on the Soviet side - more than 1 million people, 3,400 tanks, and about 3 thousand aircraft. The Battle of Kursk was commanded by: Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, Generals N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky. Strategic reserves were created under the command of General I. S. Konev, since the plan of the Soviet command provided for a transition from defense to further offensive. July 5, 1943 A massive offensive of German troops began. After tank battles unprecedented in world history (the battle of the village of Prokhorovka, etc.) on July 12, the enemy was stopped. The counter-offensive of the Red Army began.

As a result of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk in August 1943, Soviet troops captured Orel and Belgorod. In honor of this victory, a salute of 12 artillery salvoes was fired in Moscow. Continuing the offensive, Soviet troops dealt a crushing blow to the Nazis during the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. In September, Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass were liberated, in October the Dnieper was crossed, and in November Kyiv was liberated.

End of the war

In 1944-1945 The Soviet Union achieved economic, military-strategic and political superiority over the enemy. The labor of Soviet people steadily provided for the needs of the front. The strategic initiative completely passed to the Red Army. The level of planning and implementation of major military operations has increased.

In 1944, relying on the successes achieved earlier, the Red Army carried out a number of major operations that assured the liberation of the territory of our Motherland.

In January, the siege of Leningrad, which lasted 900 days, was finally lifted. The northwestern part of the USSR territory was liberated.

In January, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation was carried out, in the development of which Soviet troops liberated Right Bank Ukraine and the southern regions of the USSR (Crimea, Kherson, Odessa, etc.).

In the summer of 1944, the Red Army carried out one of the largest operations of the Great Patriotic War, Bagration. Belarus was completely liberated. This victory opened the way for advances into Poland, the Baltic states and East Prussia. In mid-August 1944, Soviet troops in the western direction reached the border with Germany.

At the end of August, the Iasi-Kishinev operation began, as a result of which Moldova was liberated. The opportunity was created for the withdrawal of Romania from the war.

These largest operations of 1944 were accompanied by the liberation of other territories of the Soviet Union - the Karelian Isthmus and the Arctic.

The victories of the Soviet troops in 1944 helped the peoples of Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in their struggle against fascism. In these countries, pro-German regimes were overthrown, and patriotic forces came to power. Created back in 1943, on the territory of the USSR, the Polish Army acted on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. The process of restoring Polish statehood began.

The year 1944 was decisive in ensuring victory over fascism. On the Eastern Front, Germany lost a huge amount of military equipment, more than 1.5 million soldiers and officers, its military-economic potential was completely undermined.

WINTER CAMPAIGN 1942/43, a designation adopted in Russian literature for military operations in Great Britain. Otech. war from November 19, 1942 to March 1943.

By the end of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the Soviets. the troops were able to stop the enemy advance in all directions. Despite the fact that the enemy achieved major successes, he failed to completely solve the tasks he had set for himself. In connection with this, in the winter of 1942/43, the military-political leadership of Germany planned to retain the captured territories and create conditions for the subsequent resumption of active offensive operations.

In turn, the leaders of the Sov. The Union was put before Kr. The army's task is to radically change the course of the war, liberate the most important industrial and agricultural areas of the south of the country, break the blockade of Leningrad, strengthen the position in the central sector of the Soviet-German. front and thereby create favorable conditions for the complete expulsion of the invaders from the territory of the USSR.

Assessing the situation that had developed by mid-November. 1942 setting, Soviet the command came to the conclusion that the main blow should be delivered in the southwestern direction. In accordance with the plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the first stage of the winter campaign it was planned to concentrate large forces in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction, encircle and destroy the enemy group in the Stalingrad area. Then, introducing additional forces from the General Headquarters reserve into the battle, defeat the enemy in the Middle Don and, with a strike in the general direction of Rostov-on-Don, cut off the escape route to the Donbass for the enemy group located in the North Caucasus. If these operations were successful, conditions were created for the defeat of the entire southern wing of the Germans. eastern front.

On November 19, 1942, the Soviet offensive began with powerful artillery preparation. troops at Stalingrad (see Battle of Stalingrad 1942–43). Having delivered powerful blows to the flanks of the enemy’s Stalingrad group, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed the encirclement on November 23. There were 22 divisions and more than 160 separate enemy units in the cauldron. However, they were not immediately destroyed.

German the command attempted to break the encirclement. For this purpose, a group was created consisting of 6 divisions, incl. 2 tank. To repel its attack it was necessary to use the 2nd Guards. an army intended to destroy the surrounded enemy. At the same time, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the commanders of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts to speed up preparations for the operation in the Middle Don. The plan of this operation was to strike in the direction of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, which would make it possible to cut off the entire group of Germans. troops in the North Caucasus from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. However, due to the need to repel the enemy's unblocking strike, changes were made to the offensive plan to reduce the scope of the operation.

December 16 owls troops went on the offensive in the Middle Don. As a result of the operation, by the end of December they broke through the enemy front. up to 340 km and advanced 150–200 km, reaching the rear of the entire enemy. grouping on the southern wing of the Soviet-Germans. front.

Successful actions of the owls. troops at Stalingrad gave the Supreme Command Headquarters the basis to plan an offensive operation to defeat the enemy in the North Caucasus (see. Battle for the Caucasus 1942–43). She set the task for the Transcaucasian Front, which operated in two operational groups - the Black Sea and the Northern: to strike in the Krasnodar direction, capture Krasnodar and prevent the enemy Caucasian group from retreating to the north-west. To do this, it was necessary to bypass Novorossiysk with a strike from the left flank of the Black Sea Group and subsequently capture the Taman Peninsula, and the formations of the Northern Group should attract the main forces of the enemy’s 1st Tank Army, pressing them to the Caucasus Ridge.

However, German the command, fearing to get another “cauldron”, even larger than at Stalingrad, began to withdraw its troops from the North Caucasus to a previously prepared defensive line between the rivers. Kuban and Manych. It assumed thus. create a continuous defense front along the line Novaya Kalitva, Armavir, Maykop. At the same time, a defensive position on Taman was being prepared. The withdrawal was carried out in 2 directions - through Rostov and to the Taman Peninsula.

Sov. The command belatedly discovered the enemy's retreat, which began from the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range on January 1, 1943. His pursuit began only on January 3 and was carried out hesitantly. On January 5, the Headquarters clarified the tasks of the Black Sea Group of Forces. She had to act in 2 directions. One group was tasked with defeating the enemy north-west of Tuapse, capturing Krasnodar, and then developing an offensive on Tikhoretsk and Bataysk, the other was to break through the enemy’s defenses north of Novorossiysk, capture the village of Krymskaya, and then, in cooperation with an amphibious assault, liberate Novorossiysk. The northern group of troops was tasked with “light pursuit” of the enemy. However, this plan was not fully implemented.

The enemy continued the systematic withdrawal of his troops to Rostov. He managed to create a stable defense front along the river by mid-January. Don and Manych. The troops of the Southern Front, advancing on Rostov from the east, were unable to overcome it and thereby cut off the escape routes of the main enemy group from the North Caucasus. However, part of the enemy forces still could not retreat to Rostov and took up defense on the previously prepared defensive line “Gotenkopf” (“Head of the Goth”, in Russian literature - “Blue Line”) on the Taman Peninsula. The owls who came to him in mid-March. the troops were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses. On March 16, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the troops of the North Caucasus Front to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

In Jan. 1943 owls The troops successfully operated in the Stalingrad and Voronezh directions. As a result of the defeat, troops and their allies at Stalingrad, significant gaps appeared in the enemy’s disposition. In such a situation in front of the owls. The command opened up the prospect of further deep dissection of enemy groups, their isolation from each other and destruction in parts. For this purpose, in the winter of 1943, the Soviet Union. troops in the southwestern direction carried out a series of offensive operations, during which the enemy was successively defeated in the areas of Ostrogozhsk, Rossosh, Voronezh, Kastorny, Kursk and Kharkov.

During the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation, the enemy was inflicted a major defeat: 15 divisions were defeated, 6 divisions suffered heavy losses, and 86 thousand people were captured. As a result of the defeat of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan enemy group, favorable conditions were created for the destruction of the enemy in the regions of Voronezh and Kastorny. The offensive here began on January 24. The next day, Voronezh was completely liberated, and on January 28, the Soviets. troops surrounded up to 9 enemy divisions south of Kastorny.

A significant gap opened in the enemy's defenses. In such a situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, believing that the defeat of the encircled enemy would not take much time, ordered the commanders of the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts to leave strictly the necessary number of troops to eliminate it, and with the main forces to develop success in the Kursk and Kharkov directions. As a result, a continuous frontal encirclement was not created. The enemy took advantage of this and managed to bring 6 of his divisions to join the main forces. But they could not avoid defeat. and Hung. divisions surrounded southeast of Kastornoye.

Powerful strikes of owls. troops inflicted in January. 1943 in the Ostrogozh and Kastornen directions led, in essence, to the defeat of it. Army Group B. Its remains were thrown back to the river line. Tim and Oskol, and a huge gap appeared in the enemy’s defense. In order to close it, the Wehrmacht command was forced to create separate consolidated formations and attract reserves not only from other sectors of the Eastern Front, but also to transfer troops from Western European countries.

In turn, the owls the command sought to build on the success achieved. The offensive was planned to be carried out in 2 directions - towards Kursk and Kharkov. It began on the day when the liquidation of the encircled group of Field General. F. Paulus, the Battle of Stalingrad ended on February 2, and developed successfully. February 8 owls troops liberated Kursk, the next day - Belgorod, February 16 - Kharkov.

Impressed by these successes, the Supreme Command Headquarters demanded that front commanders not slow down the pace of the offensive. However, the situation began to change in favor of the enemy, who in the second half of February transferred additional forces and means to the threatened areas - several infantry and 2 tank divisions. Sov. The troops by this time were significantly weakened and required replenishment with people, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and food. In this regard, the offensive began to fade. March 3 owls The troops went on the defensive to repel the blow of the enemy, who was preparing for a counter-offensive.

At the end of January, active hostilities broke out in the Donbass. Developing the offensive after encircling the enemy at Stalingrad, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts approached the industrial center of Ukraine - Donbass. At the same time, the main forces are mute. Army Groups "Don" were covered from the north and south. In such a situation, the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General. N.F. Vatutin developed a plan for an offensive operation, codenamed “Leap”.

Its plan was to deliver the main blow to Mariupol with the right wing of the front, cut through the Donbass enemy group and, together with the Southern Front, complete its defeat. The enemy, putting up stubborn resistance at intermediate lines, began to retreat in the western and southwestern directions. In this situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters clarified the task for the Southwestern Front. It was to “prevent the enemy from retreating towards Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye and take all measures to squeeze his Donetsk group in Crimea, block the passages through Perekop and Sivash and thus isolate it from the rest of the enemy forces in Ukraine.”

Confident that he is dumb. The command hastily withdraws its troops beyond the Dnieper, Vatutin demanded that the pace of the offensive be accelerated. However, the offensive began to fade. By mid-February, the armies of the front's right wing had advanced 150–300 km in battle and were simultaneously attacking in 3 diverging directions. At the same time, the front commander did not have reserves. Associations and formations operated in wide areas; the troops lacked people, military equipment, weapons, ammunition and fuel. Moreover, it is mute. the command did not intend to withdraw its troops beyond the Dnieper. It took every measure to stop the owls first. troops, and then go on a counteroffensive and restore the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German. front.

German The counteroffensive began on the evening of February 19. Having delivered powerful attacks with tank corps from the Krasnograd and Krasnoarmeisky areas, the enemy not only stopped the advance of the troops of the Southwestern Front, but also surrounded a number of formations that suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Unable to repel the enemy's blow, the Sov. the troops were forced to retreat. By March 3, they retreated 100–120 km, retreated beyond the Seversky Donets and took up defense along its left bank.

At the end of February The command regrouped its main forces to the area southwest of Kharkov and struck at the Sov, which was preparing to attack. 3rd Tank Army. On March 2, the enemy cut off her communications. By March 5, the army's 2 tank corps had lost almost all their tanks, and the rifle divisions were left without artillery and vehicles. Developing the offensive, the enemy captured Kharkov and Belgorod, forcing the troops of the Voronezh Front to retreat to the left bank of the Seversky Donets, after which the position on the southern wing of the Soviet-German. front stabilized before the start Battle of Kursk 1943.

In the central area of ​​the Soviet-German. it was planned to defeat the front. Army Group Center, which still posed a potential threat to Moscow and could be used by the Wehrmacht command to strike in the Moscow direction. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters envisaged eliminating the enemy in the Rzhev-Vyazma salient, as well as striking in the direction of Velikie Luki in order to forestall the enemy group concentrated in the areas of Smolensk and Vitebsk.

The Velikolukskaya operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front began on November 24. Stubborn battles continued until January 20, 1943. As a result of the operation of the owls. The troops defeated one and defeated another 4 enemy divisions, liberated Velikiye Luki and advanced westward 25–30 km. In addition, the interaction between Army Groups “Center” and “North” was disrupted, the joint actions of their forces on adjacent wings were hampered, and favorable conditions were created for the further advance of the Soviets. troops. To repel the attacks, the enemy was forced to additionally strengthen its grouping in the Velikiye Luki direction with 6 divisions from other sectors of the front.

In the area of ​​the Rzhev salient, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned an operation codenamed “Mars”. Its plan included a strike on the converging directions of the troops of the Kalinin Front, covering the ledge from the north and north-west, and the troops of the right wing of the Western Front from the lines on the river. Vazuza and Osuga surround the group without speaking. 9th Army and destroy it piece by piece.

The offensive began on November 25 and developed slowly. The enemy, having created a strong, defense in depth, offered stubborn resistance. In addition, heavy snow turning into a blizzard did not allow the attackers to use aviation and prevented artillery and tanks from conducting targeted fire. The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, advancing in several directions, were able to wedge themselves into enemy defenses in some areas only to a depth. from 6 to 35 km, but they could not break through it.

Maneuvering reserves, the enemy repelled the attacks of the owls. troops and in a number of areas threw them back to their original position. By December 20, the offensive capabilities of the Kalinin and Western fronts were exhausted, and they went on the defensive.

Despite the fact that the main goals of the operation were not achieved, it had a positive impact on the implementation of the plans of the Supreme Command Headquarters at the end of 1942. With active offensive actions, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts pinned down large enemy forces (up to 30 divisions) and not only did not allow them. command to transfer troops from this section of the front, but also forced it to send here an additional 4 tank and 1 motorized divisions from the reserves of the main command and Army Group Center. However, these results came at a very high price. Sov. troops lost 215.7 thousand people, incl. irrevocably - 70.4 thousand people, more than 1.3 thousand tanks.

After the defeat of the enemy at Stalingrad and Voronezh, the Supreme High Command Headquarters planned an offensive operation with the goal of destroying the main forces of the Germans. Army Group "Center" in the areas of Orel, Bryansk and Rzhev with subsequent access to the line Vitebsk, Bryansk, Gomel. It was planned to be carried out in several stages by troops of 4 fronts.

The offensive in the Oryol direction began on February 11. In 2 weeks of fighting, the troops of the Bryansk Front managed to penetrate the enemy’s defenses only 10–30 km. The troops of the Western Front, which went on the offensive on February 22, also did not achieve success, managing to advance only 1–3 km.

The introduction of troops from the Central Front into the battle did not make any significant changes. In the first days of the offensive, they broke through the enemy’s defenses in depth. up to 25 km, and the front’s mobile group advanced 100–120 km, cutting the Bryansk-Konotop railway. However, the mobile group was not supported by the rest of the front troops and itself found itself surrounded, from which it was able to escape with heavy losses. Attempts to resume the offensive in the Oryol direction were made until mid-March.

On March 21, the troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts went on the defensive at the line of Velizh, Mtsensk, Novosil, Sevsk, Rylsk. The northern face of the Kursk ledge was formed.

The fighting that took place at that time in the area of ​​the Rzhev-Vyazma salient took on a somewhat different character. At the beginning of the second ten days of February, when the Bryansk and Central fronts went on the offensive, German. The command began to withdraw individual divisions from the areas of Rzhev and Gzhatsk.

The Supreme High Command headquarters ordered the commanders of the Kalinin and Western Fronts to speed up preparations for the offensive operation. However, due to a lack of ammunition and the slow arrival of reinforcements and equipment, it was postponed again and again. Meanwhile, the enemy began a systematic withdrawal of the main forces from the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge. The beginning of the offensive of the owls. troops were fought at a low pace. On March 24, formations of the Kalinin and Western fronts approached the enemy’s defensive line along the river. Vonets, Dnieper, Osma, which they could not overcome, and went on the defensive.

The Kr offensive that unfolded at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943. The army in the southwestern and western directions attracted almost all the forces and reserves of the Wehrmacht, depriving them of power. command the ability to strengthen its groups in other directions. This made it much easier for the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to carry out an offensive operation on breaking the siege of Leningrad 1943, and the troops of the Northwestern Front - the liquidation of the enemy’s Demyansk bridgehead.

Shock groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts went on the offensive on January 12. During fierce battles, formations of 2 fronts broke through the enemy defenses and united on January 18, forming a corridor 8–11 km wide along Lake Ladoga. Land connections between Leningrad and the rest of the country were restored.

After breaking the blockade in front of the Soviets. The troops were faced with the task of firmly holding the breached corridor and ensuring the uninterrupted movement of trains along the railway line laid here. To do this, it was necessary first of all to capture the Sinyavinsky Heights. However, the offensive launched on February 10 did not develop. The enemy, relying on a natural line, which were the heights, built a strong, defense in depth. Attempts to break through continued until the beginning of March. Taking into account the spring thaw, as well as the increased resistance of the enemy, the Supreme Command Headquarters on March 2 ordered the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to stop the offensive and gain a foothold on the achieved lines.

The commander of the North-Western Front planned to liquidate the enemy in the Demyansk ledge by counter strikes under the base of the ledge with the simultaneous dissection of the formations located in it by an offensive in 5 directions. The operation began on February 15. German The command, seeing the futility of holding the Demyansk bridgehead and fearing encirclement, began withdrawing its troops from it on February 17. On February 28, formations of the North-Western Front reached the prepared enemy defensive line along the river. They caught and were stopped by the enemy.

During the winter campaign of 1942/43 Kr. The army solved a number of important problems: having launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad, it subsequently launched an offensive in a wider zone. 1200–1700 km, moving deeper. 600–700 km. The North Caucasus and the Central Black Earth regions of the country were almost completely cleared of the invaders, the blockade ring around Leningrad was broken, the immediate threat to Moscow was removed, and the liberation of the northeastern regions of Ukraine and Donbass began. The main forces of the main Wehrmacht groupings on the southern wing of the Soviet-Germans were successively defeated. front, and also caused a serious defeat to his troops in other directions.

From Nov. From 1942 to the end of March 1943, a total of St. 100 enemy divisions, or more than 40% of all forces operating against the Soviets. Union at the start of the campaign. The total enemy losses in killed, wounded, and captured amounted to almost 1 million 700 thousand people. More than 3.5 thousand tanks, 24 thousand guns and 4.3 thousand combat aircraft were destroyed and captured.

To make up for the losses, the command had to transfer 33 divisions and 3 brigades to the eastern front from Western Europe and Africa and carry out total mobilization in the country. In addition, in order to restore its broken strategic front in the south, it was forced to abandon the Demyansk and Rzhev-Vyazma bridgeheads.

At the same time, during the campaign, some of the tasks assigned to the Sov. fronts by the Supreme Command Headquarters, was not fully implemented. In particular, due to a number of miscalculations by the Sov. command, the enemy managed to avoid the encirclement and defeat of Army Group “A” in the North Caucasus, and in a number of other directions to withdraw its troops from the attacks of the Red Army troops. army and, by creating new strike groups, during the counter-offensive, disrupt their advance, in particular towards the Dnieper and in the Donbass. Ultimately, this allowed the Wehrmacht to once again stabilize the situation, hold important lines, and even seize the initiative for some time on a narrow section of the front.

Troop losses remained very large, especially in the final stages of operations. From 11/19/1942 to 3/31/1943 Sov. The Armed Forces lost ca. 968 thousand people. Sanitary losses amounted to 1 million 870 thousand people. Despite this, as a result of major victories won by the owls. troops, their groupings significantly improved their operational position, creating conditions for the development of a further offensive in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The overall balance of forces between the Soviets and Germany. front due to the huge losses of the Wehrmacht and its allies, the constant increase in the potential of the Kr. army changed in its favor. During the war, a radical change began.

Research Institute (Military History) VAGS of the RF Armed Forces